Resource Description Framework (RDF) access control suffers from an authorization conflict problem caused by RDF inference. When an access authorization is specified, it can lie in conflict with other access authorizations that have the opposite security sign as a result of RDF inference. In our former study, we analyzed the authorization conflict problem caused by subsumption inference, which is the key inference in RDF. The Rule Interchange Format (RIF) is a Web standard rule language recommended by W3C, and can be combined with RDF data. Therefore, as in RDF inference, an authorization conflict can be caused by RIF inference. In addition, this authorization conflict can arise as a result of the interaction of RIF inference and RDF inference rather than of RIF inference alone. In this paper, we analyze the authorization conflict problem caused by RIF inference and suggest an efficient authorization conflict detection algorithm. The algorithm exploits the graph labeling-based algorithm proposed in our earlier paper. Through experiments, we show that the performance of the graph labeling-based algorithm is outstanding for large RDF data.
Introduction
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) and the Web Ontology Language (OWL) are markup languages for representing information over the Web through defining and using a common ontology. In addition, RDF and OWL are used as the standard data exchange formats between heterogeneous ontology languages, and they sometimes replace existing ontology languages. Recently, related to the problem of securely accessing RDF data, several studies on RDF access control have been conducted [1] - [7] . Among these, the studies presented in [3] and [6] dealt with an authorization conflict problem caused by RDF inference, and explained the problem at a more fine-grained level of the RDF triple. The authorization conflict problem caused by RDF inference can be illustrated by the following simple example. Suppose that a user is forbidden to access an RDF triple [s 1 , p 1 1 ]. In our former study [6] , we addressed the authorization conflict problem that arises particularly from subsumption inference, which is the key inference in RDF, and suggested an efficient au- thorization conflict detection method that uses graph labeling techniques [8] .
In this paper, we also consider the authorization conflict problem caused by Rule Interchange Format (RIF) inference. RIF [9] is a Web standard rule language recommended by W3C and can be applied to RDF data in order to define additional inference rules. While RDF entailment rules [10] are statically defined for RDF inference, RIF rules can be added and deleted at any time. RIF is dynamic. As in the case of RDF inference, when a new RIF rule is specified, we have to consider the authorization conflict problem caused by the RIF inference. For example, let us consider the RIF rule [$x, p 1 In this paper, we analyze the authorization conflict problem caused by RIF inference, and we suggest an efficient authorization conflict detection algorithm that considers RIF and RDF inferences. The algorithm utilizes the graph labeling-based algorithm suggested in the former study [6] .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 briefly summarizes the formerly proposed authorization model for RDF. In Sect. 4, we analyze the authorization conflict conditions caused by RIF inference, and in Sect. 5, we suggest a conflict detection algorithm. In Sect. 6 the experimental results are presented, and finally, in Sect. 7 we present our conclusions.
However, the security object that they considered was not the RDF triple and their method was not incorporated in the standard RDF Semantics [10] . They did not consider the RIF inference.
Javanmardi et al. [4] verified authorization propagation in the various ontology relationships in OWL which are between classes, between class and individual, between individuals, between property and class, between properties, and between property and individual. However, their authorization model did not consider the authorization conflict problem caused by RDF and RIF inferences.
Jain and Farkas [3] considered the authorization conflict problem caused by RDF inference that is incorporated in RDF Semantics. However, their suggested conflict detection algorithm is inefficient when RDF data become large and many access authorizations are specified. Therefore, in our former study [6] , we adopted a heuristic approach and suggested an efficient authorization conflict detection algorithm based on graph labeling. Jain and Farkas also did not consider the authorization conflict caused by RIF inference.
Abel et al. [5] introduced a high-level access control specification language that uses the triple pattern, as in the standard RDF query language SPARQL. The specified patterns are combined with a user's query to enforce the access control. However, they did not consider the authorization conflict problem caused by RDF and RIF inferences.
Papakonstantinou et al. [7] considered the authorization conflict problem caused by RDF inference. Similar to Jain and Farkas' method, their method checks an authorization conflict by inferring all RDF triples with a security sign. However, their main contribution was to suggest a flexible security sign assignment method for RDF triples. In their method, a concrete security sign value is not assigned, but rather an abstract expression consisting of access tokens and inference operators. Whenever a specific security policy is applied, the expression is dynamically calculated. They also did not consider the authorization conflict problem caused by RIF inference.
A Subsumption Hierarchy-Based Authorization Model for RDF
In this section, we briefly introduce the authorization model presented in the former study [6] . Several parts of the former model have been updated.
RDFacl Graph
RDF data can be represented as an RDF graph consisting of RDF triples [10] . However, the RDF graph can be complex and large because a) the RDF graph includes the RDF triples for RDF/RDFS vocabularies, such as rdfs:Resource, rdfs:Class, rdf:Property, rdfs:domain, rdfs:range, and so forth, b) it represents user-defined properties as nodes, and c) basically all individuals as well as classes are included. This large and complex RDF graph makes a security officer's authorization specification task complex and ineffi- -∀ s, ∀ o ∈ {user-defined classes, individuals specified in an access authorization, blank nodes, literals} -∀ p ∈ {rdfs:subClassOf, rdfs:subPropertyOf, rdf:type, userdefined properties}
For example, Fig. 1 shows the RDFacl graph for RDF data related to a smart phone application program. It depicts user-defined classes, individuals, and literals as nodes, and subsumption relationships (rdfs:subClassOf, rdfs:subPropertyOf, and rdf:type) and user-defined properties as edges. The depicted individuals are all related to a specific access authorization, as shown in Fig. 2. 
Access Authorization Specification
An access authorization in our system has the following five tuple form and can be propagated along the hierarchy path of an RDFacl graph. Definition 2 (access authorization, Au): An access authorization Au has a five tuple form: <sub j, ob j, act, sign, type>.
-sub j is the subject to whom Au is granted.
-ob j refers to a security object, which is a triple pattern, where s and p can be substituted by $x and $y, respectively. The variables match an arbitrary value.
-act refers to an action performed for the security object. In our study, only the read operation is considered.
-sign is (+) if access is allowed, and (−) if access is forbidden.
-type is R (= Recursive) if Au can be propagated to lower classes, lower properties, or individuals along the hierarchy path of an RDFacl graph and L (= Local) if Au is not propagated. We name this propagation explicit authorization propagation. 
Authorization Conflict Detection in RDF Inference
When a new access authorization is specified, an authorization conflict with previously specified access authorizations can occur as a result of RDF inference. We named this conflict implicit authorization con f lict in our former study. Detection of the implicit authorization conflict is complex and requires significant costs. This is because multiple RDF inferences have to be considered for large RDF data. Jain and Farkas [3] suggested an instance-level authorization conflict detection method, where security signs are allocated to all individuals according to access authorizations, and all RDF inferences are performed for all the individuals. If opposite security signs are propagated for an individual by an RDF inference, this indicates that an authorization conflict has arisen. Although their method is complete and secure, it requires significant costs when data are large. "Complete" means that it considers all RDF inferences and "secure" means that it detects all authorization conflicts caused by the RDF inferences. Considering this scalability problem, we introduced an authorization-level conflict detection method [6] , where only access authorizations are examined without instance data being accessed.
The basic idea applied in our method is a heuristic approach. Whenever a new authorization conflict condition is identified, we develop an authorization-level conflict detection module specific to the condition. In this approach, we gradually construct a complete and secure authorization conflict detector that consists of various modules. In our former study, we particularly identified the authorization conflict condition caused by subsumption inference, and suggested a graph labeling-based authorization conflict detection module. In fact, the authorization conflict caused by subsumption inference is the main conflict condition in our authorization model. This is because the RDFacl graph is based on the subsumption hierarchy structure. The following example illustrates the authorization conflict caused by subsumption inference. This is a security violation of Au i − since programA accesses the RDF triples t1 and t4.
To detect the authorization conflict caused by subsumption inference efficiently, in the previous work [6] , we suggested a method in which graph labeling is applied. Figure 3 gives the outline of the suggested algorithm. First, let us briefly see how a prefix-based graph label [8] is assigned to each access authorization. For an RDFacl graph, a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) is constructed according to subClassOf and type relationships. Next, the prefix-based graph labeling is performed for the nodes of the DAG. When the s in [s, p, o] in an access authorization matches the class or individual node in the DAG, the corresponding label is allocated to the access authorization. An access authorization can have another graph label because of the subPropertyOf relationship. For the RDFacl graph, another DAG that has properties as nodes is constructed according to the subPropertyOf relationship. Again, the prefix-based graph labeling is performed for the DAG. When the p in [s, p, o] in an access authorization matches the property node in the DAG, the corresponding label is allocated to the access authorization.
If each access authorization has its graph labels, the authorization conflict caused by the subsumption relationship can be efficiently identified. As in lines 2, 7, 11, and 15, an authorization conflict can exist between ancestor and descendent access authorizations each of which has a different security sign. Let us refer to Example 1 again. We do not consider the case of descendent authorizations having an (−) sign, since forbidding access to lower classes or properties prevents the subsumption inference to upper classes or properties.
Although two access authorizations whose security signs are opposite lie in a subsumption relationship, a conflict does not necessarily occur. The first case of this kind is when the properties in the two access authorizations are not in an inheritance relationship. Let 
In the next section, based on the authorization model, we introduce the implicit authorization conflict caused by RIF inference and a conflict detection method that utillizes the algorithm shown in Fig. 3. 
Implicit Authorization Conflict Caused by RIF Inference
4.1 Introduction to RIF Rule RIF [9] is a standard rule language recommended by W3C and provides a framework for exchanging various heterogeneous rules over the Web. RIF has several dialects, such as RIF Core Dialect, RIF Basic Logic Dialect (BLD), and RIF Production Rule Dialect (PRD). RIF Core is closely related to Datalog, RIF BLD is more expressive in that it adds function symbols to RIF Core, and RIF PRD can express the kind of rules used by production rule engines, as in business rule systems. In this paper, we focus on the RIF Core dialect, which is indeed the basic core of the rule languages considered by RIF. The following defines RIF Core, which is represented in the Horn clause form, as is datalog. This RIF rule can be combined with RDF data, and the RIF atom in an RIF rule can be represented in the RDF triple pattern.
Definition 3 (RIF rule): An RIF rule R i is a formula of the form
where the premises R i B j and the conclusion R i H are RIF atoms. Assuming that an RIF rule is defined for RDF data, the RIF atom is an RDF triple pattern for the RDF data.
As an illustration, let us consider the RIF rule R 1 given in Fig. 4(c) for the RDF data of Fig. 1 . The rule infers that a person is taking part in a meeting if he is located in area A and time t2 has passed. In the rule, the RIF atoms are represented in the RDF triple pattern.
In our system, R i B j and R i H are decomposed and stored in BT and HT tables. In Fig. 4(a)(b) , the columns s, p, and o store the RDF triple pattern in R i B j and R i H, the column label stores the graph label for the triple pattern, and the column hid in the BT 
Authorization Conflict Conditions
In this subsection, we analyze the implicit authorization conflict conditions caused by RIF inference. Let us first consider the simple authorization conflict condition.
Example 2:
For the rule R 1 in Fig. 4(c) , let us consider the access authorizations in Fig. 2 
Proof:
The proof is straightforward. (1) Since access to a triple in the premises is not allowed, the RIF inference cannot arise. Therefore, if the triple in the conclusion is accessible, this constitutes a conflict. (2) If all triples in the premises are accessible, the triple in the conclusion is also accessible. If access to the conclusion is not allowed, this constitutes a conflict. (3) Let us assume that the (−) security sign is allocated to any R i B j . Then, R i H must have the (−) security sign by RIF inference. If all R k B j have the (+) security sign, R k H must have the (+) security sign. Since the two conclusions are the same triple pattern, this constitutes a conflict.
Next, let us consider the transitive authorization conflict condition. This is related to inference chains where a conclusion of an RIF rule exists in the premises of other RIF rules [11] . The following example illustrates the transitive authorization conflict condition.
A Heuristic Approach for Efficient Authorization Conflict Detection
Implicit authorization propagation by an RIF rule can bring about a conflict in the interaction with RDF inference. As shown in Fig. 5 , when a new access authorization is specified at module A, a simple or transitive conflict caused by module C can arise. However, we must also consider that, although no conflict is caused directly by RIF inference, the authorizations implicitly propagated by an RIF rule can be in conflict as a result of the RDF inference at module B. This is similar to the case where a new RIF rule is specified at module C. In this section, we suggest an authorization conflict detection algorithm that considers the interaction of RDF and RIF inferences. In particular, we consider the RDF subsumption inference presented in Sect. 3 and utilize the graph labeling-based authorization conflict detection algorithm given in Fig. 3 .
When a New Access Authorization is Specified
In this subsection, we explain the algorithm given in Fig. 6 . Let us denote a newly specified access authorization by Au new and the existing approved access authorizations by volume, medium]. If no access authorization is specified for a triple pattern, the null value is assigned. The triple patterns [$x, do, meeting], [$x, do, rest], [$x, do, walking], and [$x, do, standing] have the null value in the sign column. As in our former study, the function Method 2 uses the graph label in BT and HT in order to efficiently assign the security sign according to the explicit authorization propagation.
The second step is to perform the implicit authorization propagation according to the existing approved RIF rules, R i . In line 2 of Method 2, according to Theorem 1, the case where all R i B j have the (+) security sign and the case where any R i B j has the (−) security sign are calculated. It is clear that, in the first case, there must be no R i B j that has the null sign value for the same hid value. See the BT table in Fig. 7(b) . In line 3, if all R i B j have the (+) security sign, "1" is obtained, but if any R i B j has the (−) security sign, "0" is obtained. For example, in Fig. 7(b) , "0" is obtained for the hid values 1 and 3. Line 4 checks the authorization conflict, and lines 5 and 6 perform the implicit authorization propagation by RIF inference. See the HT table in Fig. 7(b) . Line 7 sets up the transitive authorization propagation in Theorem 2; if a mismatch occurs in the assignment, this is the conflict in (3) in Theorem 1. The While block is iterated until no new authorization propagation is executed by line 6.
If there is no conflict in the While block, the access authorizations implicitly propagated by RIF inference can be in conflict with themselves, Au new , and Au k by RDF subsumption inference. For example, in Fig. 7(b) , the vari- Fig. 7(c) .
When a New RIF Rule Is Specified
For a new RIF rule, the authorization conflict detection is similar to that described in the previous section. Let us denote a newly specified RIF rule by R new . The first step is to input R new into the BT and HT tables. The remaining steps follow lines 1 -9 in the algorithm given in Fig. 6 . If there is no authorization conflict, R new is accepted, otherwise it is rejected.
Several Considerations
In Sect. 5.1, we considered the null sign value for the RIF atoms that are not related to an access authorization. However, in real application domains, "denial takes precedence (DTP)" or "permission takes precedence (PTP)" will be considered for the default security sign [12] . In the case of DTP, the (−) sign is assigned as the default security sign. In the case of PTP, the (+) sign is assigned. If a default security policy is defined, the transitive authorization conflict condition does not arise. Only the simple authorization conflict Fig. 7 Illustration of the conflict detection algorithm. condition arises. The reason is straightforward. If a security sign is always assigned to R i H in R i by the default security policy, only the simple authorization conflict condition occurs between R i H and R i B j . Therefore, the transitive authorization conflict condition cannot arise.
Experiments

Experimental Setup
In this section, we compare the authorization conflict detection times between the instance-level detection method [3] , [7] and our authorization-level method. As mentioned in Sect. 3. 3, the instance-level method checks the authorization conflict by inferring all individuals with a security sign, and can be applied to detect an authorization conflict by RIF inference. To simulate the instance-level method, we used OWLIM [13] , which is a native RDF repository and supports RDF and RIF inferences. We measured the execution times first for allocating security signs to all RDF triples, and then, for inferring the triples with a security sign.
The test data, access authorizations, and inference rules were simple, as shown in Fig. 8 . We used them to show that even in a simple situation, the difference between the two methods is significant. In the figure, C1, C2 , . . . , and C22 are subclasses, and I k is the individual of C12. The number of individuals ranged from 100 to 100,000 to take large RDF data into consideration. In Fig. 8(b) , for the test RIF rules, we considered the inference chain from C12 to C22. Simultaneously, this will bring about the RDF subClassOf inferences from each chid class to its parent class.
The computer used in all experiments was equipped with an Intel(R)Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q8400 2.66GHz, and 1GB of memory. The experiments were performed us- Fig. 9 Comparisons of authorization conflict detection time.
ing an OWLIM standard edition and an MS SQL Server 2008 on Windows Server 2003; all codes were written in Java.
Experimental Results
First, Fig. 9(a) shows the authorization conflict detection time of the two methods according to the number of individuals. The number of access authorizations was set to 100, and the access authorizations, Au k (1 ≤ k ≤ 100) were specified against Au 0 . The RIF rules R 1 and R 2 were used. The graph shows that our authorization-level method has a shorter conflict detection time than the instance-level method according to the number of individuals. In addition, if many more access authorizations and RIF rules were to be considered, the difference between the two methods would be more significant.
Second, Fig. 9(b) shows the authorization conflict detection time according to the number of access authorizations. The number of access authorizations ranged from 100 to 100,000, and the number of individuals was set to 10,000. For RIF rules, R 1 and R 2 were used. The results graph shows that the conflict detection time of the instance-level method increases with the number of access authorizations. This is because the instance-level method assigns security signs to all individuals according to access authorizations. If the number of access authorizations were large, the difference between the two methods would be more significant.
Third, Fig. 9(c) shows the authorization conflict detection time according to the number of RIF rules. The ten RIF rules in Fig. 8(b) were used, and the number of individuals was set to 10,000. For access authorizations, Au0 and Au1 were used. The results graph shows that the authorizationlevel method performs better than the instance-level method. Since Jain and Farkas' method performs all inferences for all individuals to detect authorization conflicts, it requires a much longer detection time. However, the authorizationlevel method verifies only access authorizations without inferring individuals.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed the authorization conflict problem caused by RIF inference. In addition, we introduced an efficient authorization conflict detection method using graph labeling techniques. We verified experimentally that our method performs better than the instance-level authorization conflict detection method [3] , [7] . However, our heuristic method was designed for the subsumption inference type only, and efficient detection modules for other inference types need to be investigated.
In the previous work [14] , we suggested a non-heuristic approach for efficient authorization conflict detection for RDF inference. Contrary to the instance-level method, which infers all individuals, it infers only individuals that are specified in access authorizations and RDFS data. For example, in the access authorizations in Fig. 2 , only the in-dividuals c1 and b1 and the classes in Fig. 1 are inferred. The other individuals are excluded. We named this method hybrid authorization conflict detection. The basic idea of the hybrid approach is based on the fact that no conflict between individuals is caused by any RDF inference in our authorization model. An access authorization for an individual has a conflict only with access authorizations for classes. We already verified this observation through Theorem 1 in the previous work [6] . Therefore, in our authorization model, without inferring all individuals, it is sufficient to infer only the individuals that are specified in access authorizations and RDFS data. In the previous work [14] , we showed that the hybrid approach has a reasonable conflict detection time as compared with the authorization-level method. It also has the merits of completeness and secureness, as does Jain and Farkas' method. Our future work involves applying this hybrid approach to the RIF inference. In the approach, to detect an authorization conflict, only the individuals specified in access authorizations and RIF rules need to be inferred. Finally, our future work involves extending our authorization model and authorization conflict detection methods to OWL data, which can be combined with RIF rules.
